Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 4.djvu/898

 LowELL, C. J. This grant or liconse or, contract pur- ports to give a cooditional ownersbip pnly to the grantees, of the logs which they should eut under it. The defendants contend that the plaintiff parted with his property, and xetained only a lien. This construction is not in accordanoe with the language of the contract. No doubt his purpose was security, but in attaining it he stipulated that neither the property nor the control of it should pass from him until payment had been made. It was not an ordinary case of sale, but an arrangement covering several undertakings on the part of the grantees, which if they carried out, the prop- erty was to be theirs. , ' �The contract is in a form well known in Maine, where the grantees lived, and where standing timber is often sold in this way. Whether the contract was delivered in that state does not appear. It was held in Maine, some 30 years since, that even if the parties to such a contract described the Tendor's title as a lien, it was not within the statute concern- ing chattel mortgages, aiid .need not be recorded; and that the vendor's right was superior to that of a hona fide pur- chaser without notice. Saicyer v. Fisker, 82 Maine, 28. In most of the cases since that time thegrantor's title is spoken of as a lien, though the contracts usually retain "control and ownership," as in the contract now before us. Since those courts respect a lien as fully as they do the general owner- ship, the name is immaterial there. I suppose that the con- tract was drawn up in Maine, and I doubt if it would be a, wholly unwarrantable inference that the parties intended it to have the effect which the courts of Maine had so often gireu to similar transactions. See Emerson v. Fisk, 6 Greenl. 200; Prentiss v. Garland, 67 Maine, 345; Crosby v. Bed- vian, 10 Eep. 306; and cases not conoerning timber; Whip- pie V. KUpabick, 19 Maine, 427; Bawson v. Tuel, 47 Maine, 506; Bunker v. McKenney, 63 Maine, 529; Hotchkiss v. Jlunt, 49 Maine, 213. �The land was situated in New Hampshire, and fts the realty was converted into personalty in that statej it might iairly be contended that the law of Now Hampshire must ����