Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 4.djvu/733

 HATFIELD V. MOLLES. '?19 �The decision of these questions depends upon the construc- tion of the provisions of section 5044 of the Eevised Statutea of the United States. That section provides that, "as sooii as the assignee is appointed and qualified, the judge, * * • by an instrument under his hand, shall assign and convey to him ail the estate, real and personal, of the bankrupt, and Buch assignaient shall relate back to the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, and by operation of law shall vest the title to ail such property and estate in the assignee, although the same is then attached on mesne proeess as the property of the debtor, and shall dissolve any such attachment tnade within four montbs next preceding the commencement of the hankruptcy proceedings," �Much controversy has arisen as to the true construction of these provisions, but the weight of authority undoubtedly is that after an adjudication in bankruptcy ail attachments become invalid, and their lien is divested by. operation of law, unless more than four months shall have intervened between the issuing of the writ and the filing of the petition. See Jn re Ellis, 1 N. B. E. 655; In re Prestm, 6 N. B. E. 545; Zeiber v. Hill, 8 N. B. E. 240. �Thus, in Miller v. O'Brien, 9 Blatchf. 271, Judge Woodriiff says: "The statute, (§ 5044,) in the most explicit terms, declares the attachment dissolved.- In like explicit terms it declares that the assignment to the assignee shall relate back to the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and that the title to ail the bankrupt's estate shaU vest in the assignee." �In re Scrafford, 15 N. B. E. 104, Judge Dillon asserts that "ail attachments levied within four months before the com- mencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy are dissolved, ipso facto, by operation of such proceedings." �In Bracken v. Johnston, 15 N. B. E. 106, Justice Miller, in discussing the meaning of the section of ,the bankrupt law now under consideration, says : "The purpose of the act was to put a crediter, who undertook to secure a lien by attach- ment, in precisely the same condition as one who took a pref- erence or lien by consent of the debtor. In both cases the ����