Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 4.djvu/713

 FIBBT KAT. BANK V. BISSELL. 699 �An attempt was made, in argument at the bar, to put this case upon the footing of a numerous class in the books in wbich real property was granted upon a paroi pledge from the grantee to make Bome disposition of it ; as where a eon bas been granted an estate upon condition that he will sup- port his father during bis life-time, or where a devisee has promised the testator to divide the estate with another. In ail such cases the trust may be established by paroi, and the trust itself stands on the plainest principles of justice. But to point out the distinction between those cases and the case xinder consideration can hardly be neeessary. Foss received nothing from Bissell on account of the purchase of the prop- erty, nor did he take the property with the understanding that he should admit Bissell to an interest to" it. If he had received the property upon a pledge to hold it for Bissell, or to make some other disposition of it, his failure to do so would be a fraud upon the grantors as well as the beneficiary, of which either might complain, and the prinoiple invoked ■would be applicable. But here there was nothing of that kind. The property was sold to Posa, who in fact received it, and Bissell comes to complain that he was not admitted to the purchase, as by his agreement ■^ith Foss he should have been. However he may have been misled by the oon- duct of Foss, he was not in fact a purchaser, and Foss did not receive the property to his use in any way, and there- fore he acquired no interest in it. �If, now, we tum to the co-tenancy of the parties, we find in that relation noiîung of weight respecting the question under consideration; for although tenants in common are not at liberty to assail the common title by which they aU hold, they may deal with each other touching their respective interests. Freeman's Co-venancy, 165. While Bissell, Foss, and Hunter, and the Handley party, were ail bound to main- tain the common title, each was at liberty to purchase from the other in the same manner as a stranger might purchase from any or aU of them, Alexander v. Kennedy, 3 Grant's Cases, 380. It has never been claimed that a purchase by one co-tenant of the interest of another would enure to the ����