Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 4.djvu/67

 LINDSET V, LAMBBBT BUILDIKO & LOAN ASS'N. '53 �duty in the premises. Moreover, at that time no memBer or officer of the association, other than Casey himself, had any suspicion of the latter's insolvency, or knew of his intent to give a preference to the corporation. It is quite certain that if the relation between Casey and the association had been simply that of debtor and crediter, the payment by him to the corporation of this money, under the circumstauces disclosed by the evidence, could not have been impeached as an un- lawful preference^ �But it is contended that inasmuch as Casey was treasiirer of the corporation his knowledge of his insolvency and inten- tion to give a fraudulent preference was the knowledge of the corporation. Upon what principle, however, is the associa- tion chargeable with knowledge of Casey's insolvency? What interest had the corporation in his private affairs? Hp being the mere custodian of the moneys of the association, how did it concern the latter whether he was solvant or insolvent? Furthermore, Casey's knowledge of his insolvency was not aoquired by him while acting in his oapacity of treasurer; nor was he bound to communicate the fact to the corporation. But if the information was not acquired by him in the^course of his dutie^ as treasurer, and he was under no obligation io communicate it to the corporation, then the lattep is not chargeable with constructive notice of his insolvency. Phila- delphia y. Lockhardt, 73 Pa. St. 211; Wharton on Agency, §178. �Undoubtedly the general rule is that notice to, or knowl- edge acquired by, an agent in the course of the transaction in which he represents his principal binds the latter. There- fore, where a crediter secured a preference from an insolvent debtor through the intervention and by the solicitation of an agent, the knowledge of such agent was held to be the knowl- edge of his principal. West Philidelphia Bank v. Dickson, 95 U. S. 180, 181. But in the present case, in making the de- posit in the Bank of Pittsburgh, Casey was acting for himself and not as agent for the corporation. The latter was not seeking any preference. The association had not solicited the deposit. It was the voluntary act of Casey. The motive ����