Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 4.djvu/391

 BUBTON ». TOWN OF KOSHKONONO. 877 �rate after as before due, upon the ground of aii împlîed oon- tract, and that such is the implied agreement and understand- ing of the parties. See Spencer x. Maxjield, 16 Wis. 178. �If interest after due is reeoverable on the ground of an implied contract, then such implied contraet cornes as surely within the protection of the constitutional provision as though the contract were express. During the first 11 years of the life of these bonds, to-wit, from 1857 to 1868, the undoubted law of the state was that interest should be recovered upon the coupons overdue, so that if this suit could have been brought in 1868, before the passage of this statute, the plaintif must have recovered according to that law. Now, suppose ■we say that the statute affects the remedy merely, does it ûot affect it in so substantial a manner as to be equivalent to an impairment of the contract ? �I think it must be conceded that it cuts off a material por- tion of his cause of action, as it makes a difference of between one and two thousand dollars vrhether interest be reckoned according to the law ia force when the contract was made, or that in force when the trial is had. The distinction between impairing the obligation of the contract and changing the remedy is very misleading, unless its operation be confined where it belongs, within very narrow limits. I take it that any change in the remedy which practically cuts off a portion of the cause of action, or renders the contract of less availa- ble worth, is as much within the constitutional prohibition as a law which strikes directly at the contract itself. Other- wise it would always be in the power of a state legislature to practically nullify this great constitutional guaranty. �The remedy existing at the time the contract is made, as entering into the contemplation of the parties at that time, is part of the obligation of the contract, and it should be no more in the power of the legislature to impair that in such a way as^to render the contract of less value, than it is to impair the contract itself. See Edwards v. Kearszey, 96 U. S. 595. �But I think the statute, if made to apply to past contracts, clearly impairs the obligation of the contract itself. But, as ����