Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 3.djvu/97

 90 rEDERAL SEPOBTEB. �the discharge of the bankrupt from his detts,— those and other like powers belong to the jurisdiction in bankruptcy, and are matters and proceedings in bankruptcy of which state courts have no jurisdiction. But when a common-law action is an appropriate remedyto enforce aright asserted byan assignee in bankruptcy, whather the right is given by the bankrupt act, or existed in f avor of the bankrupt before the bankruptcy, an action to enforce or vindieate the rîght is not a matter or pro- ceeding in bankruptcy within section 711. The exercise of the original and ordinary jurisdiction of the state courts in such case is, in no proper sense, an exercise of jurisdiction in bankruptcy. The fact that the plaintiff makes his title under the bankrupt act by assignment from the debtor, or by force of operation of the act itself, does not make the suit a matter or proceeding in bankruptcy any more than would a suit brought by an assignee appointed under the state insolvent law, to recover a debt owing to the insolvent, be a proceeding or matter in insolvency. It is quite clear that the state courts are not deprived of jurisdiction of actions, by assignees, to collect the asseta of the bankrupt by the section referred to. K this was the intention of congress it is reasonable to suppose that it would have been explicitly declared, and an intention to deprive the state courts of jurisdiction will not be inferred from doubtful language, nor will the words of a statute be extended beyond their strict meaning to accomplish. this resuit." �With the exception of the case of Hallack v. Tritch, decided by Judge Hallett, from which I have quoted, no decision bas come to my knowledge by a federal court construing the effect of the amendment of 1874; and it is to be noted that the leamed judge in that case apparently based his decision mainly upon the authority of Olcott v. McLean. This case may be considered as .overruled by the subsequent cases in the same state, and especially by the exhaustive decision of the court of appeals in Kidder v. Horrobin, which I have just cited. A careful examination of the statute itself, and of the condition of the bankrupt law as expounded by the courts at the time of the enactment of this amendment, leada me to ����