Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 3.djvu/287

 280 ÏEDEEAr. REPOBTEB. �pany could noi be successfuUy worked," and that "immunitj frbm taxation is not one of them." �Nor is the authority of Humphrey y. Pegues in the least ehaken by the decision in Railroad Canes v. Gaines, 97 U. S. 697, 711-712. On the contrary, there is in this last case a clear recognition of the principle announced in the former, as the language of the chief justice, found on pages 711 and 712, will disclose. He says: "In Humphrey v. Pegues we held that the grant to one company of ail the powers, rights, and privileges of another earried with it an exemption; but in Morgan v. Louisiana, that such an exemption did not pass by sale of the franchises of a railroad company. • • * * This seems to us conclusive of the present case, The grant here was not of ail the rights and privileges of the Nashville & Chattanooga Eailroad Company, but of such as were neces. sary for the purpose of making and using the road, or, in other words, the franchises of the company, which do not include imniunity from taxation." Here it is clearly intimated that the court recognized the authority of Humphrey v. Pegues, and that but for the qualifying words, "of such as were nec- essary for the purpose of making and using the road," which distinguished the cases, the exemption olaimed would have passed. These three cases are entirely consistent, and may well stand together. �Without accumulating authorities, which could be easily done, it will suffice for us to say that, in our opinion, the leg- islature, by the use of the terms "rights and privileges," as they are employed in the several statutes before us for con- struction, intended to vest said several corporations with the privilege of exemption from taxation for the period of 20 years after the completion of their respective roads, to the same extent that such exemption h ad been granted to the Nashville & Chattanooga Company; that this conclusion is eustained by lexicographers, and by the supreme court of the United States; that said charters are contracts, within the meaning of the federal constitution, the obligations of which cannot be constitutionally impaired by legislation or judicial ����