Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 3.djvu/286

 L. A N. E. CO. V. GAINES. 279 �in its ordinary definition an exemption from such burdens as others are subjected to, as VàQ privilege of being exempt from arrest or from taxation." �From these authorities it is seen that a privilege is an ex- emption and an exemption is a privilege. Did the legislature mean by this language, as found in these several charters, that it should be construed in aecordance with these standard au- ■thorities ? On this question we are, by the decision in Humphrey V. Pegues, 16 Wall. 244, relie ved of alldoubt, if we everenter- tained any. Here, after full argument, the court held that ■where one railroad company was incorporated with the "rights, powers, and privileges" of another and pre-existing company, that the new company acquired an exemption from taxation guarantied to the former, and in support thereof say : "Ail the privileges, as well as the powers and rights of the prior company, were granted to the latter company. A more important or more comprehensive privilege than a per- petuai immunity from taxation can scarcely be imagined, It contains the essential idea of a peculiar benefit or advantage of a special exemption from a burden falling on others." �Humphrey v. Pegues is exactly similar to the case under consideration, and is conclusive, unless its authority bas been overthrown or weakened by subsequent decisions of the same court. It is insisted that it bas been overruled or materially qualified by Morgan v. Louisiana, 93 U. S. 217-223. We do not concur in this view. The questions involved in the two cases were very different. There is no conflict between them. In the first it is held that a grant to one railroad company of the "powers, rights, and privileges" of another carried to the former an exemption from taxation enjoyed by the latter, while in the second case it was decided that a foreclosure sale of the "property and franchises" of a railroad company did not vest the purchaser with an immunity from taxes pos- eessed by the company whose property was sold; because, say the court, the "franchises" of a railroad company are such as "are essential to the operations of the corporation; posi- tive rights or privileges, without whieh the road of the com- ����