Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 3.djvu/179

 173 FEDERAL REPORTEa. �in decree, untîl after the report was made, and insista that his claim should be postponed to ail other claims. �J. J. Speed, for the Dry Dock Company. �Mr. HalUday, for libellant Bloom. �F. H. Canfield, for the original libellant. �Beown, D. j. The subject of marshalling liens in admi- ralty is one whioh, unfortunately, is left in great obscurity by the authorities. Many of the rules deduced from the English cases seems inapplicable here. So, also, the principles ap- plied -where the contest is between two or three libellants would result in great confusion in cases where 50 or 60 libels are filed against the same vessel. The American authorities, too, are by no means harmonious, and it is scarcely too much to say that each court is a law unto itself. �The order in which liens are paid depends upon four con- tingencies : (1) The relative merit of the claims ; (2) the time at which the claim accrued; (3) the date at which pro- ceedings are commenced for its enf orcement ; (4) the date of the decree. The practice has grown up in this district, sanc- tioned by the long acquiescence pf the bar, of classifying claims as foUows : (1) Seamen's wages; (2) claims for tow- age and for necessaries furnished in a foreign port ; (3) claims for supplies and materials furnished at the home port, for which a lien is given by the state law ; (4) mortgages. �Bottomry bonds being unknown on the lakes, no question has ever arisen here with regard to their relative rank. That claims for wages should be paid in preference to ail others, except the costs of sale of the ship keeper, and of storage and dockage while the vessel is in the hands of the marshal, and excepting also subsequent salvage, is well settled in ail the districts. Whether one claim is entitled to priority over others of equal rank, by reason of the libel being arst filed or decree being first obtained upon it, is a matter of very con- siderable doubt — at least in cases of contract. �Nearly if not ail claims against this vessel accrued during the years 1875 and 1876, and the first exception of the dry dock Company proceeds upon the theory that claims in the third class accruing in 1876 — that is, for repairs furnished in ����