Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 2.djvu/612

 TODD r. BARK TULCHEN. 605 �duty of a consignee of a vassal is simply to make her collec- tions and disbursements and obtain business for her. What is to prevent the owners of the vessel from repudiating the action of Thackara. Cannot they corne in and say that he had no authority to answer and they are not bound by his answer. He does not even allege that he bas any such authority or that any one bas so instructed bim. I am sat- isfied that his answer is not therefore sufficient and the excep- tions to this answer sbould be sustained. �December i, 1879, Lawrence Johnson & Co. filed tbeir answer — which is also excepted to. There are many objections to this answer. In the first place it cornes too late, and upon protest the court could and under the circumstances of this case probably would, impose terms, before permitting it to be filed at ail. I am inclined to think that the present excep- tions must be taken as in effect such a protest. �In the second place Lawrence Johnson & Co., do not pre- tend that they are authorized or instructed to make answer, they do not even say that they are the general agents or attomeys for the owners, they simply allege that on the sixth day of October, 1879, they received a bill of sale for the ves- sel for English parties and for that purpose they are agents. �Besides, this answer is insufficient. It would be loose pleading, such as the rules do not permit and the court ought not to allow an answer to stand, which merely states that the respondent bas read what some other person bas said in the cause and is willing to adopt it. The twenty-seventh rule promulgated by the supreme court provides "that the answer shall be full and explicit and distinct to each separate article and separate allegation of the libel, in the same order as numbered in the libel." It follows therefore that this answer is bad and the exceptions thereto should be sustained. �This would leave the record clear for a decree pro confessa under the rules, provided the court shall be of opinion (1) that the jurisdiction can be sustained (for by the terms of the allowance indorsed on the libel the court must pass upon the sufficiency of the libel, now even if it were not bound to take ����