Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 2.djvu/569

 562 PEDBBAL BEPOBTEB. �day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-nine," remained unaffeoted by the later aot of June 22, 1874. �Of course, in this latter view of the case, ail the creditors whose claims were contracted prior to January 1, 1869, were altogether powerless to oppose the discharge of the bankrupt, either by adding their claims to the aggregate of his liabUi- ties, and thus require a greater percentage of assets, or by refusing their assent to his discharge. �In re Gifford, 16 National Bank. Eegister, September 26," 1876, Justice Withey, district judge of the western district for Michigan, sastains the former proposition, and says : "As the law now stands, we hold that in the absence of consent by creditors in voîuntary cases, no matter when commenced, or when deita were contracted, the assets must pay thirty per cent., not fifty per cent., or there can be no diseharge ; whereas, in com- pulsory cases, the bankrupt, if otherwise entitled thereto, is entitled to a discharge, irrespective of the assent of creditors or the amount of assets." He cites the opinion of Judge Lowell as confirming his own, in In re Qriffiths, 1 Central Law Journal, 506; and, also, that of Mr. Justice Miller, of the United States supreme court, reported in 1 Central Law Journal, (In re King,) 601. �Judge Drummond, of the United States circuit court, Li- diana, In re Wheeler d Eiggs, 19 B. B. 259, in a lengthy opinion, has supported this view of the case, and concludes by saying: "But, when we look at the whole scope of the amendmentof 1874, and apply the languageof the ninth sec- tion to the case now before the court, it seems to me that it was the intention of congress to declare by that section that in any case of bankruptcy, when there were no assets equal to thirty per cent., if the bankrupt secured the assent of one- fourth of his creditors in number, and one-third in value, as there stated, that he was entitled to a discharge, irrespeotive of the time when the debts were incurred; and, therefore, I hold, contrary to the opinion of the district court, that the ninth section of the act of June 22, 1874, necessarily repealed the proviso to the 611 2th section of theEevised Statutes, and ����