Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 2.djvu/402

 GILBERT HTJBBAKD & 00. V. EOACH. 395 �ing eargoes ; and this, in general, will be found to be the nature of claims which eonstitute a lien in the admiralty upon the res, or which are made the foundation for maritime actions in personam. Now, it is true that when eails and outfit are stripped from a vesel they should be stored for safe preserva- tion ; and, in the course of business, what are known as sail lofts, in which the sails and outfit may be stored, are estab- lished at ports along the lakes, and the business of such stor- age, for which compensation in the nature of rent is charged, has grown up ; but is this a service which pertains to the navigation of a vessel, and which necessarily attaches to her, in the course of her employment, as does a claim for supplies, repairs, furnishings, wharfage, mariners' wage3, and other like demands, which are indispensable to enable the vessel to perform her voyages ? It is wholly shore service, performed in store-houses on land, and, as was said in Cox v. Murray, 1 Abb. Adm'y Eep. 3e2, "the maritime quality of a service arises only when the matters performed or entered upon pertain to the fltment of the vessel for navigation, aid and relief supplied in preparing for and conducting a voyage, or the freighting or employment of her as the instrument of a voyage." �The main argument in support of the claim that storage is or should be the subject of a maritime action is that the sails and outfit cannot be safely stored on board the vessel; tbat this would be attended with the hazards of fire, robbery, and deterioration from various causes; and that to avoid these hazards it is neeessary that they be stored in other places. �But that is an argument addressed rather to the question of degree of safety than to that of absolute necessity. The storage of sails and outfit does not seem to be so imme diately and necessarily connected with the navigation of the vessel as to make it a maritime service or claim ; and, in the absence of any other authority than has been mentioned, I shall hold that it is not a subject-matter of admiralty juris- diction, either by action in rem or in personam, and the ex- ceptions to the commissioner's report upon the item for storage charged in libellant 's account will, therefore, be sustained. ����