Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 2.djvu/387

 3S0 FZDEBAL BEPOfiTSB. �In its decision in the present case the district court consid- ered the proposition that the aet of 1875, under the name of wharfage, allowed a greater sum to be charged against the John M. Welch than was a reasonable compensation for the use of the wharf, as the reasonable compensation must be the same whatever canal the boat navigated, and that the extra charge was, in substance, a burden imposed by the state upon commerce and navigation among the states, and that the act was, therefore, an illegal regulation of com- merce in that respect, and repugnant to the constitution of the United States. The court held that it could not decide that the sum charged against the John M. Welch by the act of 1875 was more than a reasonable compensation for the service. It said: "If want of apparent reason — I do not say that reasons do not exist — for the distinction iu rate made by the statute between canal-boats engaged in navigat- ing the canals of this state, North river barges, market boats^ sloops employed upon the rivers of this state, schooners ex- elusively employed upon the rivers of this state, lighters and other vessels, permits the conclusion that some of the rates are unreasonable, how can it be declared to be the liigher rate rather than the lower rate that is the unreasonable rate ? Moreover, if the state of New York has the right to fix rates of wharfage, I am unable to see how any rate declared by this statute to be legal, can by the courts be declared unrea- sonable, and for that cause illegal. The power of the state over the subject-matter of wharfage rates includes the power to discriminate as to the rate between vessels belonging to different classes and between vessels engaged in ditîerent occupations; and, when distinctions of that character are found in the statutes of the state, it must be presumed by the courts that those distinctions are founded upon some good reason. One reason may be found in the fact that vessels engaged in certain kinds of navigation are neeessarily com- peUed to spend a greater portion of their time at the wharf than is ever spent by vessels in different employment, and so may justly be allowed to obtain their wharfage at a less rate per day." Again, the court said: "The statute in no way ����