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 legal notice and proof of the loss were given and made, as required by the terms of the policy. It is admitted that at the time of the destruction of this property there was an explosion by which the entire structure was demolished. By the plaintiff it is claimed that the explosion was produced by a fire which existed prior thereto in the mill; and, therefore, the damage was produced by fire. By the defendant this is denied, and it is claimed that the damage was caused by the explosion.

There is, therefore, but one question of fact for you to ascertain under the law which I shall give you, and that is, by what cause was the damage to this property produced? The defendant, by its contract, agreed to indemnify the plaintiff against damage and loss by fire to the building and machinery of a flouring mill. Whatever may, therefore, be necessarily connected with the building and machinery, in their use in the manufacture of flour, or growing necessarily out of and resulting from such use, by which the property would be rendered more liable to fire than ordinary property, must be held to have been in the contemplation of the defendant at the time of the issuing of the policy, and it must be held to have been contracted in reference thereto; and, if the damage to the property was produced by fire, it must be liable therefor.

In law the cause to which the result must be attributed is not the cause nearest the result, but it is that cause which sets the other causes in operation. In the language of Justice Strong in ''Ins. Co. v. Boon'', 95 U.S. 130: “The is the efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets the other causes in operation. The causes that are merely accidental, or instruments of a superior or controlling agency, are not the proximate causes, and the responsible ones, though they may be nearest in time to the result. It is only when the causes are independent of each other that the nearest is, of course, to be charged with the disaster.” The rule of law announced in the foregoing case, by the learned justice, is clearly applicable to the present case.

If, therefore, the evidence satisfies your minds that there