Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 2.djvu/297

 290 FEDERAL REPORTER. �deviation from such a direct line, the less would te the arail- able space between the piers. Such a construction of the act would defeat the main purpose which congress had in view in its enactment. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the construction of the act contained in the above-quoted extract from the charge given by the court to the jury was correct. �2. It is said that the bridge was an authorized structure, being erected at an authorized place and in an authorized manner, and that this constitutes complete immunity to de- fendant. The answer to this suggestion has been anticipated in what is said above. The fact that the bridge was con- structed under authority granted by the act of congress of July 25, 1866, does not render it a legal structure, except in so far as it is found to be "according to its limitations." Such is the express provision of section 3 of that act. Besides, it is well settled that if the powers granted by the act were exceeded, or were exercised in a manner different from that provided in the grant of authority, the grant will be no protection. Dugan v. Bridge Co. 27 Penn. St. 303; Judy V. Terre Haute Bridge Co. 6 McLean, 237; Columhus Ins. Co. V. Curtenius, Id. 209. �3. It is insisted that the court erred in treating the bridge as a nuisance per se, and applying the common-law rule in such cases. By reference to the charge it will be seen that the court used the foUowing language: "Though you may find from the testimony that the width between the piers as construeted is less than the act of congress requires, yet this violation of the law by the defendant, in the construction of its bridge, is not available to plaintiff in recovering damages, unless it caused or contributed to the injury by plaintiff complained of." �I am of the opinion that the court here states the true rule upon the subject. At ail events the charge seems to have been, in this respect, ail that the defendant had a right to ask. It is not necessary now to determine whether the bridge in question is so far unlawful and unauthorized as to be sub- ject to removal as a public nuisance. It may be that in a ����