Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/712

 700 FEDBBAL BEPOKTER. �Without meaning to refer to such "exceptions" in general, I have to say that, for reasons given in the sequel, I caimot take tfae lutter view of the peremptory "exception" which was pleaded iu the suit between these parties in Louisiana, the judgment in which is sued upon here. The Code of Practice in Louisiana dofines pereuiptory exceptions to be "those which tend to the dismissal of the suit;" some of them relating to forms, others arisiug from the law. ihe exception in this case tended to the dismissal of the suit on the ground that, as a matter of law, the defendant could not be brought into court by service of process upon the agent who, as the petition alleged and the exception did not deny, negotiated the insurance, received the premiums, delivered the policy, and was the acting agent of the defendant in the city of Shreveport ; could not, for the reason that he was not what the plea calls the "general" agent of the Com- pany in Louisiana, appointed in accordance with the law concerning non-resident insurance companies enacted in 1877. �I consider that such was the matter of law fornially submitted for decision on the twelfth of April, 1879, by defendant 's counael io the exception set eut in the record; and though the court, in its judgment rendered on that day, probably after argument on the exception, does not expressly declare that the exception was formally overruled, yet that it was overruled is a necessary implication from the tenor of the j udgment. �The court of Louisiana having decided that the defendant was before it by force of the service of citation on its agent, Taber, and not merely byits appearance "alone to file" the exception, it may not be competent for me to pass upon the propriety of that decision ; but I feel bound by the earnestness of defendant's contention to looli behind the judgment of the court a quo, into the validity of the process by which the defendant was held to have been brought into court. �That a corporation doing business in a state other than that from which its charter is derived, and in which its principal office is held and its chief business is conducted, — doing business there and every- where else, as corporations must of necesity do, through the agency of natural persons, — may be sued and brought into court in that state by the service of process on its agent there, independently of any stat- ute law or warrant of attorney expressly authorizing such service, has been very authoritatively decided. �The case of Moulin v. Ins. Co. 1 Dutcher, 57, was similar to the one at bar in its essential features, except that there, there was no ��� �