Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/610

 598 FEDERAL REIPORTEB. �because said transfer was a mere fraudaient scheme to deprive Vue plaintiff of bis rights against said property. But he had no diatinct- ive right against any other than the guilty res respectively; certainly no lien upon all the property of the owners prior to a judgment in personam in admiralty, or upon execution levied subsequent to. judg- ment at common law. It is true that under exceptional circum- stanees courts of equity have lent their aid to creditors at large, and generally when the property sought to be charged was already in the custody of the court by force of a trust, receivership, etc. �The case of Garrisony. Memphis Ins. Co. 19 How. 312, canhardly be considered as fully sustaining the plaintili's proposition, although, from the imperfect statement of that case, it would seem to be held that because an insurer is in equity subrogated to the rights of the insured, he may before judgment at law proceed to enf orce his demand against the owners of a vessel. The cases cited in that opinion do not go to the length here claimed; for the court only insists upon the rule whereby the insurer, subrogated to the rights of the insured, may enforce the lien on a judgment recovered by the insured, and "may apply to equity whenever an impediment exista to the exei'cise ef his legal remedy in the name of the assured." To those familiar with the common-law practice then prevailing to a large extent, the true meaning of that expression \^ the court is clear. In that case there were 11 contractsof affreightment dependent on the construction each was to receive — the disaster being one and the same — and, to avoid multiplicity of suits, embraced in one bill. �In Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119; S. C. 101 U. S. 688, a fuller exposition of equitable principles is given. The same case was twice before the United States supreme court, substantially, and the views expressed in 101 U. S. 688, are especially instructive. The first bill was dismissed because, as the court says, "it was not averred that judgment at law had ever been recovered against the parfcnership for the debt, and that an execution had been issued thereon and returned fruitless." It then proceeds to state under what circumstances a crediter may, without judgment and execution previously had, pursue his demand in equity. Taking the most liberal of the rules stated in that case, as exceptions to the general proposition, the case before the court will not fall strictly within any of them ; for each must be considered in the light of the equitable circumstances upon which it depends. ��� �