Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/540

 628 FEDERAL REPORTER. �It doea not distinctly appear by the bill in this case tha^ the tax in question was assessed before the act of 1867 was passed. But, even if it be assumed that it was, the right to bring this suit cannot be held to have been a right saved by section 34 of the act of 1867. The suit was not brought before the act of 1867 took effect. If the remedy existed because the assessment had been made, the remedy had not attached to any vested right. There was no right except the right to the remedy, and the right to the remedy was only tho remedy. Congress could take away the remedy without taking away any "right accrued." Memphis v. U. S. 97 U. S. 293, 297, 298. Constru- ing the inhibitory provision in the act of 1867 as taking away any right, if it existed before, to bring this suit, is not eonstruing it so as to affect any "act done" or "right accrued" under any former act, in the sense of those expressions as used in section 34 of the act of i 867. Nor can this suit be held to be a suit for an act done in violation of an act prior to the act of 1867, relating to a subject embraced in that act, within the meaning of section 34 of the act of 1867. �There is another view. The act of 1867, including section 34, is repealed by section 5596 of the Revised Statutes, because portions of that act are embraced in the Revised Statutes, and in lieu of section 34 the provisions of section 5597 of the Revised Statutes are in force. That section providea as follows: "The repeal of the several acts embraced in said Eevision shall not afiect any act done, or any right accruing or accrued, or any suit or proceedings had or commenced in any civil cause before the said repeal, but all rights and liabilities under said acts shall continue, and may be enforced in the same manner as if said repeal had not been made." To sustain this demurrer does not affect any act done before the act of 1867 took eiiect. It does not affect any right accrued before that time. The right to ap- ply for an injunction as a remedy, is not sueh a right as the statute means. It is a mere remedy. In Terrij v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 633, it is said: "As to the forms of action or modes of remedy, it is well settled that the legislature may change them at its discretion, provided adequate means of enforcing the right remain." In regard to the subject-matter of this suit it bas been repeatedly held that the means provided by statute, and left in force, for enforcing any right of the plaintiff, without the existence of the remedy by injunction, are adequate means, in the sense of this rule. To recur to section 6597, this suit was not commenced before the Revised Statutes were enacted. AU rights of the plaintiff in any sense in which the word "right" is used in section 5597 continue, although the right to the ��� �