Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/500

 488 FEDEIIAL BEPOBTSB. �should disturb and unsstttle the great landmarks of property. "When a rule has been once deliberately adopted and declared it oiight not to be disturbed unless by a court of appeal or review, and never by the aame court, except for very cogent reasons, and upon a clear manifestation of error; and if the practice were otherwise it would be leaving us in a state of perplexiug un certainty as to the law." �And upon stare decisis Judge Cooley says, (see Const. Lim. 61 :) �" ilie doctrine of stare decisis, however, is only applicable, in its full for<e, within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts making the decisions, since there alone can such decisions be regarded as having established any rules." �And further: �" It will, of course, sometimes happen that a court will flnd a former decis- ion so unfounded in law, so unreasonable in its deductions, or so mischievous in its consequences, as to feel compelled to disregard it. Before doing so, however, it will be well to consider whether the point involved is such as to liave becorae a rule of property, so that titles have been acquired in reliance upon it, and vested rights will be disturbed by any change; for, in such a case, it may be better the cori'ection of the error be left to the legislature, ■which can control its action so as to make it prospective only, and thus pre- vent unjnst consequences." �There can be no doubt that, since the Bradish Johnson Case, if not before that time, business men in this circuit have had the right to consider the rule laid down in that case as the law of this circuit, and no doubt many rights have been acquired under such view of the law, �In argument, the opposite doctrine has been most ably maintained, and I have been eloquently urged to recognize the true prinoiples that ought to prevail, and thus settle the rule in this circuit on a firm foundation; but, unfortunately, my views tend to unsettle, rather than settle, the rule ; and, were I to give them f all effect, no one in this circuit could tell whether domestic lien or mortgage were better until be ascertained whether the circuit justice or the circuit judge would try bis case on appeal. �My duty, then, is to subordinate my views to those of the learned circuit justice, and follow the doctrine of stare decisis, leaving to the court of appeal or review, as suggested by Kent, or the legislature, as Buggested by Cooley, the business of correcting the error, if any there be. �The judgment of the district court, then, should be affirmed. �Let a decree in proper terms, and to that effect, be entered, with costs against appellants. ��� �