Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/468

 e56 FKDEBAL BEPOAIEIt. �rendered in favor of each defendant, with costs. Like practice has prevailed here in all cases within the provision of the act of 1813 whenever the court's attention was directed to the subject. �The cases under consideration fali cleariy within the practice tbus long established ; and this is the first time in 35 years that it has been disputed. It must be said, however, that there may be a differ- ence between the consolidation of cases to be tried as one case, and the trial of separate cases before the same jury at the same time. Many of the authorities and text-writers cited do not note the distinc- tion, and few make any reference to the act of 1813. �From facts and circumstances brought to the attention of the court, it was obvious that the same question was involve d in each of these two cases, viz., whether the plaintiff sustained damages through the negligence of one or the other of the defendants, and if bo, whether one or both were responsible therefor. If the cases were tried, one after the other, the same evidence would have to be presented, to the unnecessary delay of business. No exception was taken to the order of the court, and, if it had been, it wonld have been promptly over- i-uled. The reason and justice of the act of 1813 must be apparent to all who desire the prompt determination of litigated cases, without useless costs and expense. �It is contended that by this practice the two defendants were brought into antagonism with each other, as well as with the plaintiff, whereby an unnecessary burden, attended with some confusion, was thrown on the transit company. But so, in like cases, it always be- came the duty of the court to discriminate, as it did in these cases, between the respective duties and liabilities of the defendants. �The cases were peculiar in several respects. The wrong done occurred under such circumstances as at first blush to make it a question between the defendants inter sese as to which was in fault. To the plaintiff, who could have but one satisfaction, it was im- material whether one only or both defendants were responsible to him. As to the liabilities of the defendants inter sese he had no concern. He had a right of recovery against both, (as held,) and if either paid therefor it could adjust with the other any controversy which might arise between them. �The principal facts were that plaintiff purchased a through (cou- pon) ticket from New York to the city of St. Louis; the last coupon being over the Indianapolis & St. Louis Eailroad Company from Indianapolis to St. Louis. That coupon did not authorize the ciontracting party or parties to leave the plaintiff in East St. ��� �