Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/455

 c, M. & ST. P. ET. eo. V. S. a. ac bt. v. e. co. 443 �were esl;abM,sbed; that thereupon the lands in place ou that Une passed to tlio trustee from the United States, and the grant ceased to be afloat ; and that no power in the government, except congress, could change that line so as to authorize the complainant company to go beyond its prescribed limita on either side for lands in place, or for indemnity lands. If this view can be sustained it seems to be concedei that no considerable part of the lands in dispute can be awarded to the complainant. Doubtless, in ordinary cases of land grants for railroads, the principle for which the defendant contends prevails. When the line of the road is definitely located and assented to by the proper department the limits of the grant are fixed ; titles to specifie lands accrue to the state in trust for the enterprise, and to purchasers from the United States, within the defined limits of the grants ; and any subsequent change of the line and the consequent limits of the grant would lead to great confusion of rights and titles. �But we are of opinion that the grant now before us is peculiar, and that the rule claimed by the defendant cannot be strictly applied to it. Here was a grant in the same act for two railroads which were to intersect eaeh other in O'Brien county. There was no authority in the law to make the intersection beyond the limits of O'Brien county, and if the law had been in this regard violated, we can see no ground upon which the McGregor Company or its successors could have claimed the land. Now, until the line of the Sioux City & St. Paul road was located it was simply impossible to fix definitely the line of the other road through O'Brien county to the point of junction, so as to conform to the requirements of the act of congress. Hence the line of 1864 within O'Brien county was necessarily an open and indefinite one until that of the rival company was established, about two years later. If at any time before the location of the defendant's line in O'Brien county the line of 1864 had been projected westward, the point of intersection would have been beyond the limits of O'Brien county. We judge both from the nature of the case and the history oi the transaction that both the federal and state governments must have regarded the line of 1864 within the limits of O'Brien county as open and indefinite until the line of the other road was located. It matters not, in our opinion, that the line of 1864 may have been accepted and acted upon by both governments as to public lands lying upon it east of Clay county. Such a recognition of it is not, as far as we can see, at all ineonsistent with a contemplated change of the line in Clay and O'Brien counties, so as to make it conform to ��� �