Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/420

 408 FEDERAL REPORTBR. �otherwise the proper jurisdictional facts exis^t. Every court must, in the nature of things, have the right, as well as the power, to carry its own judgments into execution. To take from any court the pre- rogative of executing its own judgments by proper process or by sup- plemental proceedings, when necessary, would be to cripple its juris- diction in a most essential matter. It would, therefore, be diffioult to persuade us that congress meant by the provision in the act of 1875 for the removal of "suits of a civil nature" to authorize the transfer of coiitroversies growing out of mere modes of execution and relief, thns directly interfering with the state courts in the execution of their own judgments. It is not in this sense that the worda "suits of a civil nature" are ordinarily used. �Now, the process of garnishment after judgment is clearly a mode of execution. Its purpose is to obtain satisfaction of the judgment out of the debtor's effects which may be in a third person's hands. The garnishment, therefore, is inseparably connected with the judg- ment. If money is realized it is to be applied to the satisfaction of the judgment. Suppose that an issue, taken upon the garnishee's answer, should be removed to the federal court, (the original case remaining, as it must remain, in the state court,) and suppose the federal court should deliver judgment against the garnishee, and by execution or otherwise the money should be collected, how could the federal court enter satisfaction, the judgment not being under its control ? We see in this the embarrassment that must arise from the attempt to separate the garnishment proceeeding from the judg- ment, the latter remaining in one court and the former carried to another and different court. �This branch of the rule is clearly illustrated by the case of Webler V. Humphreys, 6 Dillon, 223. The motion in that case was manifestly a mode of execution. The plaintiff had a judgment against a Mis- souri corporation, and the statute of Missouri provided substantially that upon a return of nulla hona the judgment crediter might, by motion, with due notice, obtain an order from the court for execution against a stockholder to an amount equal to the balance of bis unpaid stock. Here the unpaid stock is treated as assets belonging to the corporation, and the statute provides the judgment crediter with a mode of execution to reach such assets. It was held by the circuit court for the district of Missouri that the motion could not be trans- ferred from the state to the federal court, notwithstanding the fact that there was a new controversy between the plaintiff and a new and different party. ��� �