Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/404

 392 FEDERAL REPORTER. �bearing on this question, have been cited, and a large number can be found, which cases leave the question open — still unsettled. English authorities cited do not bear on the case, because of the dif- ferent jurisdiction of English admiralty courts, particularly since the admiralty act of 24 Vict. c. 10. See Parsons, Shipp. 842. �It is easily seen that there is no good reason for drawing the dis- tinction sought to be made. The contract, which is the basis of this action, is indisputably a maritime contract. It relates -wholly to ships, cargoes, freights, etc., on navigable waters. If it had been half complied with, not an objection could have been suggested as to our jurisdiction. If the defendants had broken their contract to the exteut of one baie of cotton only, we could have amerced them. Are they to escape scot-free by the magnitude of their breach ? �In the case of Watts v. Camors, lately decided in this court, the owners, for a total breach of a charter-party, filed a libel in personam against the charterers, and although the court held the charterers liable, no suggestion of want of jurisdiction was made; and I under- stand these libels have generally been allowed in this circuit. �The third objection argued is that the contract was executed in Great Britain and is to be eonstrued according to the law of the place of contract, and that under the laws of Great Britain it was not a maritime contract, and the court of admiralty would not have juris- diction either in rem or in personam; and cited The Daunebrog, 4 Ad. & Ecc. 386. �The restricted jurisdiction of the English admiralty courts ha s been frequently noticed by our courts, and see act, 24 Vict., called the "Admiralty Court Act." �.Justice Bradley says, in 11 Wall., quoted above, that the place where a maritime contract is made does not aflFect its character, and that our admiralty jurisdiction depends on the nature and eflfect of the contract. �The other objections are based on the proposition that Maury & Co. had cancelled the contract by their notification to the defendants that they would hold them in damages for non-eompliance, and by their refusai to give orders to the Eomulus after the time for fulfill- ing the contract had expired. It can hardly be elaimed that the persistent demanda of Maury for the execution of the contract or damages for non-execution should be eonstrued as a cancellation of the same, and yet that is all this proposition seems to amount to. �The whole fact is that defendants contracted to furnish the libel- lant a ship of certain character between the fifth and twentieth of ��� �