Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/375

 PEOPLE V. COMPAGNIE ' GENERALE TRANSATLANTIQUK. 363 �the law can be prevented more certainly by executing it wliile the articles are in its custody. It would not, however, be less an impost or duty on the arti- cles if it were to be levied on them after they were landed. ihe policy and consequent practice of levying or securing the duty before or on entering the port does not limit the power to that state of things, nor, consequently, the prohibition, unless the true meaning of the clause so confines it. What, then, are 'imports?' The lexicons inform us they are 'things imported.' If we appeal to usage for the meaning of the word we shall recoive the same an- s wer. They are the articles themselves which are brought i nto the counti-y. 'A duty on imports,' then, is not raerely a duty on the act of importation, but is a duty on the thing imported. It is not, taken in its literal sense, confined to a duty levied while the article is entering the country, but extends to a duty levied after it has enteredthe country. ihesuoceeding words of the' sentence, which limit the prohibition, show the extent in which it was understood. The limitation is, * except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws.' Now, the inspection lawa, so far as they act upon articles for exportation, are generally executed on land, before the article is put on board the vessel ; so far as they act upon importations, they are generally exe- cuted upon articles which are landed. The tax or duty of inspection, then, is a tax which is frequently, if not always, paid for service performed on land, while the article is in the bosom of the country. Yet this tax is an excep- tion to the prohibition on the states to lay duties on imports or exports. The exception was made because the tax would otherwise have been within the prohibition." �These observations are persuasive to show that persons are not imports or exports, or the subjects of inspection laws, within section 10 of article 1. The word "imports" and the word "exports" must have equal extent and scope. The former can have no greater than the latter. The suggestion that persons departing from the United States by vessel could properly be said to be exported, or to be ex- ports, under any circumstances, even when retransported by public authority, is not one which commends itself to the general uuder- standing. If not exports they cannot be imports. The fact that the importation of persons is referred to in section 9 of article 1 has no effect to include persons within the word "imports," where that word is used. The clause referred to prevents congress from prohibiting prior to 1808 "the migration or importation of such persons" as any of the states then existing should think proper to admit. So far as this section referred to the involuntary arrivai of persons, it had refer- ence to persons brought in to become slaves and articles of merchan- dise. �There is nothing authoritative in the Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283, or in any other decision of the supreme court, which conflicts ��� �