Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 10.djvu/202

 190 feskbal bepobteb. �of feeling or otpleasure and pain, and the phenomena of conation or of will and desire." Mr. Eain, belonging to a very different sehool, arrives, in an authoritative work, substantially at the aame resuit. Ment. & Mor. Science, (2d Ed.) 2. "The only account of mind'strictly admissible in scientitic psy- chology consista in specifying three properties or functions,— /ee^ra^', will or volition, and thought or intellect, — through which all our experience, as well objective as subjective, is built up. This positive enumeration is what must stand for a definition." He proceeds to say that " feelino inoludes all our pleasures and pains, and certain modes of excitement, or of consciousness simply, that are neutral or indifferent as regards pleasure and pain. The pleiisures of warmth, food, music, the pains of fatigue, poverty, remorse, the excitement of hurry and surprise, the supporting of a light weight, tTie tounh of a table, the sound of a dog barking in the distance, are f eelings. The two leading divisions of the feelings are commonly given as sensations or emo- tions." " Will ok volition comprises all the aetioTis of human beings in so far as impelled or guided by feelings, Eating, walking, building, sowing, speaking are actions performed with some end in view ; and ends are com- prised in the gaining of pleasure or the avoiding of pain. Actions not prompted byfeeling are not voluntary. Such are the powers of nature — wind, gravity, electricity, etc. ; so, also, the organic f unctions of breathing, circulation, and the movements of the intestines." Thought, intellect, intelligence, or cognition, includes the powers known as perception, memory, conception, abstraction, reaaon, judgment, and imagination. It is analyzed, as will be seen,into three functions, called discrimination or consciousness of difference, similarity or consciousness of agreement, and retentiveness or memory. TJie mind can seldom operate exelusioely in any one of these three modes. A feel- ing is apt to be accompanied more or less by will and by thought. 'When we are pleased, our will is moved for continuance or increase of the pleasure, (will ;) we at the same time discriminate and identify the pleasure, and have it impressed on the memory, (thought.)" �If we apply this analysis to the hypothesis before us, we will see that the latter cannot stand. A man, for instance, is assaulted by another, or concoives himself so to be, so as to be in danger of losing either life or that which is more precious to him than life. Eeelino is the flrst function of the mind which is here addressed; but this necessarily involves thousht. "Is the assault intentional ?" " Was it design|d ?" " Can I inf er, judging from former assaults, or from what I have observed or heard, that it is aimed at life?" " Can it be repelled In no other way than by killing the assailant ? " Pursuing inquiries such as tiiese, fbelinq, guided by thought, directs the will to the particular object. Without thought, feeling would strike blindly into mere space. Even in the lowest point of view, discrimination is needed to distin- guisl) the victim from others, and judgment to determine that killing him is a proper act of self-defence. Thought, therefore, is necessarily involved in the act of killing, and the killing takes place because the assailant thinks it best. To constitute a valid plea of derangement in such a case, it is neces- sary to show that the perceptive and reasoning powers were deranged; other- wise, the case would not difler from that of homicide in a sudden fit of rage. �Or take the case of " kleptomania." The feeling which lies at its base is ��� �