Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 1.djvu/838

 830 FEDERAL BBPORTEB. �as between himself and his copartner, took it as money, could not well be made out. �If it is suggested that the mere payment of money into the firm operated ■yjso facto, and because it was money, as a dis- charge of that amount of the indebtedness of Belknap to his copartner, whether the copartner knew of it or not, and whether he consented to it or not; it may be answered, so far as this case is concerned, that it is not proved that Belknap was then indebted to his copartner in account ; but if the par- ties desire to have the true state of that account appear, in case of an appeal, leave will be given to show the facts. But another answer is, that to hold that payment of the money in, without the knowledge and consent of the copartner, oper- ates, because it is money that is paid in, as a payment, would simply be to apply to the case blindly, and without regard to its reason and nature, the maxim that money has no ear- mark. �As above pointed out, this rule goes no further than this in proteoting the receiver of money, and extinguishing the former title ; that the title changes only where the money is received as money, with the bona fide belief on the part of the receiver that it was the money of the party paying it. Clearly, Franklin M. Ketchum, if his rights as an individual, in his relations to his copartner, are considered — and it will be observed those are the only rights entitled to considera- tion — was not such a receiver of this money. It must not be lost sight of in this matter that if the firm is not liable for the money received and used by the firm, through Belknap, with fuU notice of the rights of Morris Ketchum in it, it is an exception from the well settled rules of the law of partner- ship, which, for strong reasons of public policy and justice, make the act of one partner, in the course of the firm's busi- ness, the act of ail, and the knowledge of the one partner, in the like case, the knowledge of ail; and the equity of the innocent partner, which is strong enough to countervail and override this well settled and ]ust rule of law, must be a real equity, based on the actual existence of facts, which would ren- ��� �