Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 1.djvu/795

 UNITED BTATES ». BAtIGH. 787 �technical sense, and not in the latitudinous sense which may be given them in proper perlance. �The term infamous there used is a term of the law, and is to be construed as such with technical precision. �As the offence charged is not treason, and is not expressly declared by act of congress to be a felony, it is a misdemeanor. It may, therefore, be tried on information, unlesa it is of that class of misdemeanors which fall within the designation of crimen falsi. �The charge is for embezzling a letter containing money, and a conviction for embezzlement has never beeu held to renderthe party convicted incompetent to testify, which is the test by which the character of an offence may be determined to be or not crimen falsi. �In the case of the U. S. v. Lancaster, 2 McLean, it was decided that ail offences under the post-ofBce laws are misde- meanors. If, then, embezzlement is not an infamous offence, the offence charged in this information is clearly not infa- iQOus. Moreover, as it is not charged or averred in the infor- mation that the letter embezzled' went into the defendant's possession by virtue of his employment, the offence as set forth in the heading does not even involve a breach of trust. �It has of late years been so often held by this and other federal courts that offences not infamous may be tried on information, that I hardly deem it necessary to refer to the decisions. Judge Dillon has so decided in U, S. v. Maxwell, a case which has frequently been quoted and relied on in this court. See 21 Int. Eev. Eec. 148; see, also, U, S. v. Shep- herd, 1 Abb. U. S. Eep. 432. In the case of the U. S. v. Henry Miller it was so decided by this court. That case was much stronger than this, because the offence could much more appropriately be regarded as crimen falsi. In that case the charge was of conspiring to defratid the United States. The defendant was tried at Norfolk, convicted, and sentenced to the peniteutiary. �Under the federal law it is not the mode or measure of the punishment prescribed that determines the character of offences, as is the case under the statute of Virginia. Hence ��� �