Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 1.djvu/785

 ' PHCENIX INS, CO. V. WTJLF. 777 �in the grocery and there served the subpœna on him, and inquired for his wife, when the officer was informed that it was early in the morning and she -was up stairs in bed, where the family lived. The officer then and there, in the gro- cery, handed to the husband a copy of the subpœna for his ■wife. Upon these facts was there a valid service on Bertha Wulf, under the thirteenth equity rule, which declares that the service of ail Bubpœnas shall be by a delivery of a copy thereof, by the officer serving the same, to the defendant personally, or by leaving a copy thereof at the dwelling-house or usual place of abode of each defendant, with some adult person who is a member or resident in the family ? It is urged by counsel that the officer handed to Henry Wulf a copy of the subpœna -when he vas not "at the dwelling-house or usual place of abode ;" that the grocery room was as dis- tinct from the residence in the iipper story as if the two had been in separate buildings, wide apart. That construction of the rule is narrow and unreasonable, It is eonceded that if the officer had handed the copy to the husband in the hall the service would bave been good, because the upper story was approached only through the hall, and it was therefore connected with the dwelling. �There were but two ways of ingress to the residence or upper story ; one from Virginia avenue, through the grocery, and the other through the door opening from Coburn street. The fami'" passed in and out both ways, as best suited their convenience. A copy was left with one who understood its contents, and was likely to deliver it to the person for whom it was intended. The case of Kïbhe v. Benson, 17 Wall. 625^ is cited against the sufficiency of the service. That was an action of ejectment in the circuit court of the United States, for the northem district of Illinois, which had adopted th& statute of Illinois relating to actions of ejectment. After judgment was entered for the plaintiff by default, the defend- ant filed a bill iu equity to set aside the judgment on the ground that he had no notice or knowledge of the pendency of the suit, and for fraud. The Illinois statute required that in actions of ejectment, when the premises were actually ��� �