Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 1.djvu/679

 hAVrS V. EMIGBAMT INDUSTRIAL BAVINSB BANK. 671 �a time, and failing to make known to persons within the state the fact of his continued existence, imports such a represen- tation that he is dead that another person leaming of these facts, or being able by inquiry to leam them, and also to ascertain that they are the sole foundation for the issu of the letters of administration, can be said to be deceived as to ■ any matter of fact. • �The facts, indeed, are not inconsistent with continued lîfe. The second case of Roderigas shows clearly that a person dealing with an administrator is, held not only to knowledge of what evidence the surrogate acted on, which can be ascer- tained by inspection of the record, but also to inquiry as to whether he acted judicially or not — a fact which maybe con. trary to what appears on the face of the record. Applying this rule ; and ail persons dealing with a person holding lettera in a case like this must be held to know that the proof of death rests wholly on evidence not inconsistent with the fact of life, and, that, therefore, if the person is alive the judg- ment of the surrogate that he is dead cannot be conclusive against him; there is, as it seems to me, no element of an estoppel in pais, because there is no deception or false rep- resentation of any fact. The party deals with the matter knowing that the supposed decedent may be alive. He knows, therefore, it would seem, that he takes or deals with his property subject to that risk. But, however this may be, there is another ground on which the doctrine of equitable estoppel clearly cannot avail to sustain this proceeding. �It is the established rule of law that no person can avail nimself of the declarations or conduct of another person as an equitable estoppel or estoppel in pais, unless those declara- tions or that conduct was in fact known to him at the time he parted with vaine or otherwise altered his position in reli- ance thereon, for the very obvions reason that the ground and the only ground of the estoppel is that the party was influ- enced by the declaration or conduct to part with value or otherwise change his course of action. And nothing can be clearer than that declarations or conduct of one person, in order to influence the action of another, must be known to ��� �