Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 1.djvu/239

 HALL V. PENN. K. CO. 231 �ance; that these authorities, with the military force sum- moned by them, were repelled; and that the train, with these goods, vfas thereupon destroyed by an incendiary fire, �While these circumstances would not protect the defend- ant against a failure to fulfil its obligations as a common carrier, yet I cannot say that an involuntary technical default warrants an imputation of negligence to the defendant touch- ing a cause of loss which is expressly excepted from its lia- bility. �4. The defendant was deprived of the control of the train containing the plaintiff's goods, and was prevented from oon- tinuing their transit, by a force it was unable to resist. It cannot be held responsible for the purpose of the mob, although the aet of the mob in intercepting the transporta- tion of the goods might subject the defendant to compensa- tion to the plaintiff for any loss sustained by him by reason of such interrupted transit of his goods. I decline, therefore, to affirm this proposition. �5. This proposition is affirmed, with the qualification that I do not say that the defendant was in fault, otherwise than as and for the reason stated in the answer to proposition 3J. �6. I decline to affirm this proposition. The exception in the bill of lading is that the carrier shall not be liable "for loss or damage on any article or property whatever, by fire or other casualty, while in transit, or while in depôts or places of transhipment." The engagement of the carrier is to assume the custody of the property entrusted to him at the point of shipment and to deliver it at the place of destination, and the obvious intent, as well, I think, as the clear import, of the exception, is to protect him against the consequences of fire during the continuance of his duty as a carrier. His quali- fied liability is co-extensive with this duty, and he forfeits its protection only by some fault of his own in connection with the casualty to which the exception refers. Nor can I regard it as within the reason of the exception to hold that it is elimi- nated from the contract when the property in the carrier's charge is wrested from him by a hostile force, which he ia unable to resist, and it is consumed in an incendiary fire. ��� �