Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 1.djvu/226



In admiralty.

James I. Kay, for libellant.

P. G. Knox, J. & J. H. Barton and J. H. Miller, for respondents.

In view of the growing tendency of the decisions of the supreme court towards the expansion of admiralty jurisdiction in this country, I think a claim for lockage in a public navigable river may properly be regarded as a subject of a maritime nature, and so cognizable by a court of admiralty. It has not been authoritatively so classified, but the reasons for such classification apply as decisively to it as to other recognized subjects of admiralty cognizance. Lockage is a service which is purely maritime, and which respects rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation; and, as necessary to the use of artificial appliances by which navigation is facilitated, it is not only beneficial to commerce, but is indispensable to enable vessels engaged in it to proceed on their voyage.

I have no doubt, therefore, from the nature of the appellant's claim, that it is within the general jurisdiction of the district court as a court of admiralty.

How may it be enforced, by a libel in rem or in personam? If the former, it can only be on the basis of a lien against the vessel to which credit was given. A lien arises:

1. By virtue of the general maritime law, in view of the nature of the claim or service, and the circumstances surrounding it.

2. By virtue of a local statute expressly creating it.

As to the latter of these classes it is only necessary to say