Page:Federal Reporter, 1st Series, Volume 1.djvu/171

 HEEEMAN V. BEEF SLOXJGH MANDF'g CO. 163 �that the use of the Chippewa river by the public as a highway for the transportation of logs and lumber is a right common to ail, recognized and protected by the municipal law ; and that such rig'at must continue so long as the public have any need of its exercise, unless changed or abrogated by the legis- lature of the state or by congress. And there is no reason why it should not be so. It is the general commerce of the river which it is the object of the constituton and laws to keep inviolate. �Navigation proper, or, in its more limited sense, that is by steamboats, vessels, sloops, ships, barges, etc., is but a branch of commerce, which includes ail these and much more, and, when navigable streams are best fitted for other branches oi commerce, it is the true interest of the public to preserve them inviolate for the purposes to which they are best adapted, Brig City of Erie v. Canfield, 27 Mich. 479 ; Moore v. Sanbome, 2 Mich. 519; Delaware e Hudson Canal Co. v. Lawrence, 2 Hun, 163. Nor do I overlook the fact that it is alleged in the plaintiff's bill that the defendants bave entered upon the business of cutting and running large quantities of pine logs without any authority for bo doing in their charters. That allegation is more a conclusion of law than a statement of a fact; but considering it as an allegation of fact it makes the case no better ; for the river is still a common highway for the floating of logs, open to ail persons who have occasion to use it, and these companies, as against other individuals, would be entitled to the protection of the law applicable to ail. And if the state did not complain it is difficult to sce how an individual could. �Suppose a corporation organized under the state law for banking purposes engage in the business of farming or dis- tilling, and use the common highways of the country for the purpose of carrying the products of the farm or distillery to market. Is there any doubt that the same law of the road would apply to it that applies to ail ? or would it be claimed that such corporation might be eiajoined, at the suit of a pri- vate individual, from such a use o f a common highway, be- cai;se the business it had engaged in was ultra vires? ��� �