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 DMCA, truly rest upon a careful construction of the statute rather than on the judge’s manifest visceral dislike of the defendants.

That the court’s hostile rhetoric provides the key to understanding its analysis is further evidenced by the fact that, considered on its own terms, Reimerdes articulates a facially dubious construction of the statutory text. (c)(1) of the DMCA, for example, states Congress’s intention not to constrict the scope of the fair use doctrine. According to the Reimerdes court, this provision signified only that fair use remained a defense to a claim for copyright infringement but did not provide a defense to a claim arising under the DMCA. As so construed, however, (c)(1) is mere surplusage, adding nothing to the statutory fair use defense to copyright infringement already provided in of the Copyright Act. Settled principles of interpretation counsel against a construction that renders statutory language superfluous.

Still more troubling is the tension between the court’s interpretation of the text of the DMCA and the provisions of the copyright treaties that the DMCA was enacted to implement. As the Reimerdes court noted, Congress passed the DMCA to implement the United States’ obligations under the WIPO Copyright Treaty. Article 11 of that Treaty requires signatory nations to prohibit circumvention of technological measures “that restrict acts. . . which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.” Fair use of copyrighted