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6 The standard for finding a congressional abrogation is stringent. Congress, this Court has often held, must make its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity “unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.” E.g., Kimel, 528 U. S., at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U. S. 277, 287 (2011) (“[W]here a statute is susceptible of multiple plausible interpretations,” we will not read it to strip immunity). We have invoked that clear-statement rule, and applied it equivalently, in cases naming the federal government, States, and Indian tribes as defendants. See, e.g., FAA v. Cooper, 566 U. S. 284, 290–291 (2012); Kimel, 528 U. S., at 73; Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community, 572 U. S. 782, 790 (2014). CPI argues that the rule should not likewise apply to Puerto Rico, citing Congress’s plenary power over Territories. See Brief for CPI 25–26 (“The concept of plenary power” is “incompatible with forcing Congress to express its intent unequivocally”). But we have similarly described Congress’s power over the tribes, and still demand that Congress “unequivocally express” an intent to abrogate their immunity. Bay Mills, 572 U. S., at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted); see ibid. (“Although Congress has plenary authority over tribes, courts will not lightly assume that Congress in fact intends” to abrogate their immunity). Our precedent thus conveys a consistent message: If a defendant enjoys sovereign immunity (which we are assuming the Board does), abrogation requires an “unequivocal declaration” from Congress. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U. S. 223, 232 (1989).