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2 the crisis, helping Puerto Rico “to achieve fiscal responsibility and access to the capital markets.” §2121(a). The idea was to set up a system for overseeing Puerto Rico’s finances, while also enabling the Commonwealth to gain bankruptcy protections similar to those available under the Code. See ''Financial Oversight and Management Bd. for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC'', 590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 3–4).

PROMESA creates, as its centerpiece, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico—the petitioner here. The statute describes the seven-member Board as an “entity within the territorial government” of Puerto Rico. §2121(c)(1). And this Court has affirmed that the Board’s structure, duties, and powers make it “part of the local Puerto Rican government.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 14). Under PROMESA, the Board approves and enforces the Commonwealth’s fiscal plans and budgets, and supervises the Commonwealth’s borrowing. See §§2141–2144, 2147. The Board also represents Puerto Rico in so-called Title III cases—judicial proceedings, modeled on federal bankruptcy proceedings, for restructuring the Commonwealth’s (and its instrumentalities’) debt. See §§2161–2177.

With one exception, PROMESA says nothing explicit about abrogating sovereign immunity. The exception is for Title III cases, and comes via the Federal Bankruptcy Code. PROMESA incorporates, as part of its mechanism for restructuring debt, the Code’s express abrogation of sovereign immunity. See §2161(a) (incorporating 11 U. S. C. §106 for “case[s] under [Title III]”). But as to all other matters PROMESA addresses, Congress did not mention sovereign immunity. In particular, no provision states that it is abrogating any immunity the Board possesses from legal claims.

At the same time, several provisions of PROMESA contemplate that, even outside the Title III context, the Board may confront legal claims against it. Most fundamentally,