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10 Nor do the litigation protections in PROMESA fill the gap. At the most basic level, it would be peculiar to read shields from lawsuits as unmistakably subjecting the Board to lawsuits (by abrogating immunity). But aside from that, CPI is wrong to think that those shields would be “pointless” or “superfluous” unless PROMESA generally abrogates the Board’s immunity. Brief for CPI 38. Consider first Section 2125’s protection of the Board, its employees, and its members from monetary liability for carrying out PROMESA. That provision would do work whenever, as discussed above, some other law abrogated or waived the Board’s immunity from specific claims. In such a case, the claim could go forward, but Section 2125 would stop the award of money damages. Of particular note, that section would limit the Board’s liability in Title III cases, in which PROMESA has indeed abrogated immunity. See. And last, Section 2125 protects individuals—the Board’s members and employees—not covered by the Board’s sovereign immunity. All in all, that seems like more than enough to explain the provision’s existence. Similarly for Section 2126(e), which prevents challenges to the Board’s fiscal and budgetary decisions. Yes, sovereign immunity insulates the Board itself from those attacks. But without Section 2126(e), a plaintiff might get around that immunity via an Ex parte Young action—a suit against an individual Board member for injunctive relief. See Virginia Office for Protection and Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U. S. 247, 254–255 (2011) (describing the Ex parte Young “limit on the sovereign-immunity principle”). Section 2126(e) precludes that possibility. So it too has a role to play in a scheme with sovereign immunity.

In short, nothing in PROMESA makes Congress’s intent to abrogate the Board’s sovereign immunity “unmistakably clear.” Kimel, 528 U. S., at 73. The statute does not explicitly strip the Board of immunity. It does not expressly authorize the bringing of claims against the Board. And its