Page:Executive Order 14028.pdf/5

Rh

Such agencies shall provide such reports every 60 days after the date of this order until the agency has fully adopted, agency-wide, multi-factor authentication and data encryption.
 * (ii) Based on identified gaps in agency implementation, CISA shall take all appropriate steps to maximize adoption by FCEB Agencies of technologies and processes to implement multifactor authentication and encryption for data at rest and in transit.
 * (iii) Heads of FCEB Agencies that are unable to fully adopt multi-factor authentication and data encryption within 180 days of the date of this order shall, at the end of the 180-day period, provide a written rationale to the Secretary of Homeland Security through the Director of CISA, the Director of OMB, and the APNSA.

(e) Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security acting through the Director of CISA, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and the Administrator of General Services acting through the Director of FedRAMP, shall establish a framework to collaborate on cybersecurity and incident response activities related to FCEB cloud technology, in order to ensure effective information sharing among agencies and between agencies and CSPs.

(f) Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Administrator of General Services, in consultation with the Director of OMB and the heads of other agencies as the Administrator of General Services deems appropriate, shall begin modernizing FedRAMP by:
 * (i) establishing a training program to ensure agencies are effectively trained and equipped to manage FedRAMP requests, and providing access to training materials, including videos-on-demand;
 * (ii) improving communication with CSPs through automation and standardization of messages at each stage of authorization. These communications may include status updates, requirements to complete a vendor’s current stage, next steps, and points of contact for questions;
 * (iii) incorporating automation throughout the lifecycle of FedRAMP, including assessment, authorization, continuous monitoring, and compliance;
 * (iv) digitizing and streamlining documentation that vendors are required to complete, including through online accessibility and pre-populated forms; and
 * (v) identifying relevant compliance frameworks, mapping those frameworks onto requirements in the FedRAMP authorization process, and allowing those frameworks to be used as a substitute for the relevant portion of the authorization process, as appropriate.

Sec. 4. Enhancing Software Supply Chain Security. (a) The security of software used by the Federal Government is vital to the Federal Government’s ability to perform its critical functions. The development of commercial software often lacks transparency, sufficient focus on the ability of the software to resist attack, and adequate controls to prevent tampering by malicious actors. There is a pressing need to implement more rigorous and predictable mechanisms for ensuring that products function securely, and as intended. The security and integrity of “critical software”—software that performs functions critical to trust (such as affording or requiring elevated system privileges or direct access to networking and computing resources)—is a particular concern. Accordingly, the Federal Government must take action to rapidly improve the security and integrity of the software supply chain, with a priority on addressing critical software.

(b) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Commerce acting through the Director of NIST shall solicit input from the Federal Government, private sector, academia, and other appropriate actors to identify existing or develop new standards, tools, and best practices for complying with the standards, procedures, or criteria in subsection (e) of this section.