Page:Examining the U.S. Capitol Attack.pdf/7

 training to support the CDU platoons and did not authorize CDU platoons to use all available less-than-lethal munitions, which could have enhanced officers' ability to push back rioters.

These operational failures were exacerbated by leadership's failure to clearly communicate during the attack. USCP leadership gathered in a command center, blocks away from the Capitol building. Two incident commanders identified as responsible for relaying information to front-line officers were forced to engage with rioters during the attack, making it difficult for them to relay information. As a result, communications were chaotic, sporadic, and, according to many front-line officers, non-existent.

Opaque processes and a lack of emergency authority delayed requests for National Guard assistance. The USCP Chief has no unilateral authority to request assistance from the National Guard; the USCP Chief must submit a request for assistance to the Capitol Police Board for approval. Steven Sund never submitted a formal request to the Capitol Police Board for National Guard support in advance of January 6. Instead, Steven Sund had informal conversations with the House Sergeant at Arms, Paul Irving, and the Senate Sergeant at Arms, Michael Stenger, regarding the potential need for National Guard support. No one ever discussed the possibility of National Guard support with the Architect of the Capitol, the third voting member of the Capitol Police Board.

The members of the Capitol Police Board who were in charge on January 6 did not appear to be fully familiar with the statutory and regulatory requirements for requesting National Guard support, which contributed to the delay in deploying the National Guard to the Capitol. In their testimony before the Committees, Paul Irving and Steven Sund offered different accounts of when Steven Sund first requested National Guard assistance during the attack. Phone records reveal a number of conversations between Steven Sund and Paul Irving on January 6. However, because there is no transcription of the conversations, there is no way for the Committees to determine when the request was made. National Guard assistance was delayed while Steven Sund attempted to contact the Capitol Police Board members and obtain the required approvals. Regardless of what time the request was made, the need to await Capitol Police Board approval during an emergency hindered the ability to request District of Columbia National Guard ("DCNG") assistance quickly.

'''The intelligence failures, coupled with the Capitol Police Board's failure to request National Guard assistance prior to January 6, meant DCNG was not activated, staged, and prepared to quickly respond to an attack on the Capitol. As the attack unfolded, DOD required time to approve the request and gather, equip, and instruct its personnel on the mission, which resulted in additional delays.''' Prior to January 6, USCP informed DOD officials on two separate occasions that it was not seeking DCNG assistance for the Joint Session of Congress. The D.C. government, by contrast, did request unarmed troops for traffic support, and on January 6, 154 unarmed DCNG personnel were staged at traffic control points throughout the city. As the attack unfolded, USCP and the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia ("MPD") both pleaded with DOD officials for immediate assistance. DOD officials claimed they received a "workable" request for assistance from USCP at approximately 2:30 p.m. The request was presented to the Acting Secretary of Defense and approved at approximately 3:00 p.m. For the next ninety minutes, DOD officials ordered DCNG personnel to return to the Armory, obtain necessary gear, and prepare for deployment as leaders quickly