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 fairly faced, it becomes plain, I think, that there are serious objections to any possible alternative.

To begin with, it may be held that whenever any man asserts an action to be right or wrong, what he is asserting is merely that he himself has some particular feeling towards the action in question. Each of us, according to this view, is merely making an assertion about his own feelings: when I assert that an action is right, the whole of what I mean is merely that I have some particular feeling towards the action; and when you make the same assertion, the whole of what you mean is merely that you have the feeling in question towards the action. Different views may, of course, be taken as to what the feeling is which we are supposed to assert that we have. Some people might say that, when we call an action right, we are merely asserting that we like it or are pleased with it; and that when we call one wrong, we are merely asserting that we dislike it or are displeased with it. Others might say, more plausibly, that it is not mere liking and dislike that we express by