Page:Ethics (Moore 1912).djvu/57

 Our theory asserts, therefore, in its second part: That, if we had to choose between two actions, one of which would have as its sole or total effects, an effect or set of effects, which we may call A, while the other would have as its sole or total effects, an effect or set of effects, which we may call B, then, if A contained more pleasure than B, it always would be our duty to choose the action which caused A rather than that which caused B. This, it asserts, would be absolutely always true, no matter what A and B might be like in other respects. And to assert this is (it now goes on to say) equivalent to asserting that any effect or set of effects which contains more pleasure is always intrinsically better than one which contains less.

By calling one effect or set of effects intrinsically better than another it means that it is better in itself, quite apart from any accompaniments or further effects which it may have. That is to say: To assert of any one thing, A, that it is intrinsically better than another, B, is to assert that if A existed quite alone, without any accompaniments