Page:Ethics (Moore 1912).djvu/235

 for it is quite possible, theoretically, that quantity of pleasure should always be a correct criterion of right and wrong, here in this world, even if intrinsic value is not always in exact proportion to quantity of pleasure. But though this is theoretically possible, it is, I think, easy to see that it is extremely unlikely to be the case. For if it were the case, what it would involve is this. It would involve our maintaining that, where the total consequences of any actual voluntary action have more intrinsic value than those of the possible alternatives, it absolutely always happens to be true that they also contain more pleasure, although, in other cases, we know that degree of intrinsic value is by no means always in proportion to quantity of pleasure contained. And, of course, it is theoretically possible that this should be so: it is possible that the total consequences of actual voluntary actions should form a complete exception to the general rule: that, in their case, what has more intrinsic value should absolutely always also contain more pleasure, although, in other cases, this is by no means always