Page:Ethics (Moore 1912).djvu/213

 we had willed differently, is that those who deny that we ever could have done anything, which we did not do, often speak and think as if this really did involve the conclusion that we never should have acted differently, even if we had willed differently. This occurs, I think, in two chief instances—one in reference to the future, the other in reference to the past. The first occurs when, because they hold that nothing can happen, except what will happen, people are led to adopt the view called Fatalism—the view that whatever we will, the result will always be the same; that it is, therefore, never any use to make one choice rather than another. And this conclusion will really follow if by “can” we mean “would happen, even if we were to will it.” But it is certainly untrue, and it certainly does not follow from the principle of causality. On the contrary, reasons of exactly the same sort and exactly as strong as those which lead us to suppose that everything has a cause, lead to the conclusion that if we choose one course, the result will always be different in some respect from what it would have been,