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 instead; so that, if everything has a cause, nothing ever could have happened except what did happen.

And now let us assume that the premise of this argument is correct: that everything really has a cause. What really follows from it? Obviously all that follows is that, in one sense of the word “could,” nothing ever could have happened, except what did happen. This really does follow. But, if the word “could” is ambiguous—if, that is to say, it is used in different senses on different occasions—it is obviously quite possible that though, in one sense, nothing ever could have happened except what did happen, yet in another sense, it may at the same time be perfectly true that some things which did not happen could have happened. And can anybody undertake to assert with certainty that the word “could” is not ambiguous? that it may not have more than one legitimate sense? Possibly it is not ambiguous; and, if it is not, then the fact that some things, which did not happen, could have happened, really would contradict the principle that