Page:Ethics (Moore 1912).djvu/176

 ; or that to act justly is a rule which ought absolutely always to be obeyed; and similarly it might be suggested with regard to many other kinds of action, that they are actions, which it is either always our duty, or always wrong to do.

But once we assert with regard to any rule of this kind that it is absolutely always our duty to obey it, it is easy and natural to take one further step and to say that it would always be our duty to obey it, whatever the consequences might be. Of course, this further step does not necessarily and logically follow from the mere position that there are some kinds of action which ought, in fact, absolutely always to be done or avoided. For it is just possible that there are some kinds which do, as a matter of fact, absolutely always produce the best possible consequences, and other kinds which absolutely never do so. And there is a strong tendency among persons who hold the first position to hold that, as a matter of fact, this is the case: that right actions always do, as a matter of fact, produce the best possible results, and wrong actions never. Thus even those who would