Page:Ethics (Moore 1912).djvu/167

 That is to say, we are not now urging that anything would be any good at all, unless somebody had some feeling towards something; nor are we urging that there are not many things, which are good, in one sense of the word, and which yet would not be any good at all unless somebody had some feeling towards them. On the contrary, both these propositions, which are very commonly held, seem to me to be perfectly true. I think it is true that no whole can be intrinsically good, unless it contains some feeling towards something as a part of itself; and true also that, in a very important sense of the word “good” (though not in the sense to which I have given the name “intrinsically good”), many things which are good would not be good, unless somebody had some feeling towards them. We must, therefore, clearly distinguish the question whether these things are so, from the question which we are now discussing. The question we are now discussing is merely whether, granted that nothing can be intrinsically good unless it contains some feeling, a thing which is thus good and does contain this feeling cannot be good without