Page:Ethics (Moore 1912).djvu/157

 in another Universe, it may quite easily not be right to prefer a set of effects precisely similar to A to a set precisely similar to B.

For this reason, the view that the meaning of the words “good” and “bad” is merely that some being has some mental attitude towards the thing so called, may constitute a fatal objection to the principle which we are considering. It will, indeed, only do so, if we admit that it must always be right to do what has the best possible total effects. But it may be held that this is self-evident, and many persons, who hold this view with regard to the meaning of “good” and “bad” would, I think, be inclined to admit that it is so. Hence it becomes important to consider this new objection to our principle.

This view that by calling a thing “good” or “bad” we merely mean that some being or beings have a certain mental attitude towards it, has been even more commonly held than the corresponding view with regard to “right” and “wrong”; and it may be held in as many different forms. Thus it may be held that to say that a thing is “good” is the same thing as to say that