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 needed to show that what mankind are generally pleased with is always right. And some of those who have used this argument do not seem to have seen that any such proof is needed. So soon as we recognise quite clearly that to say that an action is right is not the same thing as to say that mankind are generally pleased with it, it becomes obvious that to show that mankind are generally pleased with a particular sort of action is not sufficient to show that it is right. And hence it is, I think, fair to say that those who have argued as if it were sufficient, have argued as if to say that an action is right were the same thing as saying that mankind are generally pleased with it; although, perhaps, if this assumption had been expressly put before them, they would have rejected it.

We may therefore say, I think, that the theory that to call an action right or wrong is the same thing as to say that an absolute majority of all mankind have some particular feeling (or absence of feeling) towards actions of that kind, has often been assumed, even if it has not been expressly held. And it is, therefore, perhaps worth while to point