Page:Ethics (Moore 1912).djvu/14

 It should be noticed that, if we define voluntary actions in this way, it is by no means certain that all or nearly all voluntary actions are actually themselves chosen or willed. It seems highly probable that an immense number of the actions which we do, and which we could have avoided, if we had chosen to avoid them, were not themselves willed at all. It is only true of them that they are “voluntary” in the sense that a particular act of will, just before their occurrence, would have been sufficient to prevent them; not in the sense that they themselves were brought about by being willed. And perhaps there is some departure from common usage in calling all such acts “voluntary.” I do not think, however, that it is in accordance with common usage to restrict the name “voluntary” to actions which are quite certainly actually willed. And the class of actions to which I propose to give the name—all those, namely, which we could have prevented, if, immediately beforehand, we had willed to do so—do, I think, certainly require to be distinguished by some special name. It might, perhaps, be thought that