Page:Ethics (Moore 1912).djvu/136

 intrinsically better than those of Y, and in that case Y will be wrong, even though its total effects are precisely similar to those of X and X was right. Both conditions must, therefore, be satisfied simultaneously. But our theory does imply that any action which does resemble another in both these two respects at once, must be right if the first be right, and wrong if the first be wrong.

This is the precise principle with which we are now concerned. It may perhaps be stated more conveniently in the form in which it was stated in the second chapter: namely, that if it is ever right to do an action whose total effects are A in preference to one whose total effects are B, it must always be right to do any action whose total effects are precisely similar to A in preference to one whose total effects are precisely similar to B. It is also, I think, what is commonly meant by saying, simply, that the question whether an action is right or wrong always depends upon its total effects or consequences; but this will not do as an accurate statement of it, because, as we shall see, it may be held that right and wrong do, in a sense, always