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 merely be that we (or anybody else) have the belief in question. This is impossible, because, if it were the case, we should not be believing anything at all. For let us suppose it to be the case: let us suppose that, when I believe that A is B, what I am believing is merely that somebody believes that A is B. What I am believing, on this supposition, is merely that somebody (either myself or somebody else) entertains the belief that A is B. But what is this belief which I am believing that somebody entertains? According to the theory it is itself, in its turn, merely the belief that somebody believes that A is B. So that what I am believing turns out to be that somebody believes that somebody believes—that A is B. But here again, we may substitute for the phrase “that A is B,” what is supposed to be identical with it—namely, that somebody believes, that A is B. And here again we may make the same substitution; and so on absolutely ad infinitum. So that what I am believing will turn out to be that somebody believes, that somebody believes, that somebody believes, that somebody believes